Method and system for actively defending a wireless LAN against attacks

ABSTRACT

A wireless network security system including a system data store capable of storing network default and configuration data, a wireless transmitter and a system processor. The system processor performs a network security method. An active defense request signal is received, typically from an intrusion detection system. The received request signal includes an indicator of an access point within the wireless computer network that is potentially compromised. In response to the received an active defense of the wireless network is triggered. The triggered active defense may be on or more of transmitting a jamming signal, transmitting a signal to introduce CRC errors, transmitting a signal to increase the difficulty associated with breaking the network encryption (typically by including in the signal packet appearing legitimate but containing randomized payloads, or transmitting a channel change request to the potentially compromised access point.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT APPLICATIONS

[0001] This application claims the benefit, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.§19(e), of applicants' provisional U.S. patent application Ser. No.______, filed May 20, 2002, entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR NETWORKSECURITY”, with attorney docket no. 19282.0001U1, which application ishereby incorporated by this reference in its entirety for all purposes.

[0002] This application is related to the following U.S. patentapplications filed Jun. 3, 2002, each of which is hereby incorporated bythis reference in its entirety for all purposes: Attorney Serial DocketNo. Inventors Title Number 19282.0001U2 Hrastar, “SYSTEMS AND TBA Lynn,METHODS FOR NET- Sale, WORK SECURITY” Hollingsworth 19282.0002U1 Hrastar“SYSTEM AND METHOD TBA FOR WIRELESS LAN DYNAMIC CHANNEL CHANGE WITHHONEY- POT TRAP” 19282.0005U1 Hrastar, “METHODS AND TBA Lynn SYSTEMS FORIDENTI- FYING NODES AND MAPPING THEIR LOCA- TIONS” 19282.0006U1 Hrastar“METHOD AND SYSTEM TBA FOR ENCRYPTED NET- WORK MANAGE- MENT ANDINTRUSION DETECTION”

BACKGROUND

[0003] The present invention is directed to systems and methods forenhancing security associated with electronic communications. Morespecifically, without limitation, the present invention relates tocomputer-based systems and methods for assessing security risks andidentifying and responding to threats in wireless network environments.

[0004] The Internet is a global network of connected computer networks.Over the last several years, the Internet has grown in significantmeasure. A large number of computers on the Internet provide informationin various forms. Anyone with a computer connected to the Internet canpotentially tap into this vast pool of information.

[0005] The information available via the Internet encompassesinformation available via a variety of types of application layerinformation servers such as SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol), POP3(Post Office Protocol), GOPHER (RFC 1436), WAIS, HTTP (HypertextTransfer Protocol, RFC 2616) and FTP (file transfer protocol, RFC 1123).

[0006] One of the most wide spread method of providing information overthe Internet is via the World Wide Web (the Web). The Web consists of asubset of the computers connected to the Internet; the computers in thissubset run Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) servers (Web servers).Several extensions and modifications to HTTP have been proposedincluding, for example, an extension framework (RFC 2774) andauthentication (RFC 2617). Information on the Internet can be accessedthrough the use of a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI, RFC 2396). A URIuniquely specifies the location of a particular piece of information onthe Internet. A URI will typically be composed of several components.The first component typically designates the protocol by which theaddress piece of information is accessed (e.g., HTTP, GOPHER, etc.).This first component is separated from the remainder of the URI by acolon (‘:’). The remainder of the URI will depend upon the protocolcomponent. Typically, the remainder designates a computer on theInternet by name, or by IP number, as well as a more specificdesignation of the location of the resource on the designated computer.For instance, a typical URI for an HTTP resource might be:

[0007] http://www.server.com/dir1/dir2/resource.htm

[0008] where http is the protocol, www.server.com is the designatedcomputer and /dir1/dir2/resouce.htm designates the location of theresource on the designated computer. The term URI includes UniformResource Names (URN's) including URN's as defined according to RFC 2141.

[0009] Web servers host information in the form of Web pages;collectively the server and the information hosted are referred to as aWeb site. A significant number of Web pages are encoded using theHypertext Markup Language (HTML) although other encodings usingeXtensible Markup Language (XML) or XHTML. The published specificationsfor these languages are incorporated by reference herein; suchspecifications are available from the World Wide Web Consortium and itsWeb site (http://www.w3c.org). Web pages in these formatting languagesmay include links to other Web pages on the same Web site or another. Aswill be known to those skilled in the art, Web pages may be generateddynamically by a server by integrating a variety of elements into aformatted page prior to transmission to a Web client. Web servers, andinformation servers of other types, await requests for the informationfrom Internet clients.

[0010] Client software has evolved that allows users of computersconnected to the Internet to access this information. Advanced clientssuch as Netscape's Navigator and Microsoft's Internet Explorer allowusers to access software provided via a variety of information serversin a unified client environment. Typically, such client software isreferred to as browser software.

[0011] Electronic mail (e-mail) is another wide spread application usingthe Internet. A variety of protocols are often used for e-mailtransmission, delivery and processing including SMTP and POP3 asdiscussed above. These protocols refer, respectively, to standards forcommunicating e-mail messages between servers and for server-clientcommunication related to e-mail messages. These protocols are definedrespectively in particular RFC's (Request for Comments) promulgated bythe IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). The SMTP protocol is definedin RFC 821, and the POP3 protocol is defined in RFC 1939.

[0012] Since the inception of these standards, various needs haveevolved in the field of e-mail leading to the development of furtherstandards including enhancements or additional protocols. For instance,various enhancements have evolved to the SMTP standards leading to theevolution of extended SMTP. Examples of extensions may be seen in (1)RFC 1869 that defines a framework for extending the SMTP service bydefining a means whereby a server SMTP can inform a client SMTP as tothe service extensions it supports and in (2) RFC 1891 that defines anextension to the SMTP service, which allows an SMTP client to specify(a) that delivery status notifications (DSNs) should be generated undercertain conditions, (b) whether such notifications should return thecontents of the message, and (c) additional information, to be returnedwith a DSN, that allows the sender to identify both the recipient(s) forwhich the DSN was issued, and the transaction in which the originalmessage was sent.

[0013] In addition, the IMAP protocol has evolved as an alternative toPOP3 that supports more advanced interactions between e-mail servers andclients. This protocol is described in RFC 2060.

[0014] The various standards discussed herein by reference to particularRFC's are hereby incorporated by reference herein for all purposes.These RFC's are available to the public through the Internet EngineeringTask Force (IETF) and can be retrieved from its Web site(http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html). The specified protocols are not intendedto be limited to the specific RFC's quoted herein above but are intendedto include extensions and revisions thereto. Such extensions and/orrevisions may or may not be encompassed by current and/or future RFC's.

[0015] A host of e-mail server and client products have been developedin order to foster e-mail communication over the Internet. E-mail serversoftware includes such products as sendmail-based servers, MicrosoftExchange, Lotus Notes Server, and Novell GroupWise; sendmail-basedservers refer to a number of variations of servers originally based uponthe sendmail program developed for the UNIX operating systems. A largenumber of e-mail clients have also been developed that allow a user toretrieve and view e-mail messages from a server; example productsinclude Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Outlook Express, NetscapeMessenger, and Eudora. In addition, some e-mail servers, or e-mailservers in conjunction with a Web server, allow a Web browser to act asan e-mail client using the HTTP standard.

[0016] As the Internet has become more widely used, it has also creatednew risks for corporations. Breaches of computer security by hackers andintruders and the potential for compromising sensitive corporateinformation are a very real and serious threat.

[0017] Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) offer a quick and effectiveextension of a wired network or standard local area network (LAN). FIG.1 depicts a typical LAN 190 including both wired and wirelesscomponents. The wired component depicted in FIG. 1 includes a variety ofconnected systems including local servers 120, local clients 130 andnetwork accessible data storage components 110. By simply installingaccess points 180A, 180B to the wired network (e.g., Ethernet 150 androuter 140), personal computers and laptops equipped with WLAN cards170A, 170B can connect with the wired network at broadband speeds.

[0018] Over the last few years, most deployments of WLANs have conformedto the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11bstandard that operates over the unregulated 2.4 GHz frequency spectrum.The 802.11b standard offers connectivity of up to 11 Mbps—fast enough tohandle large e-mail attachments and run bandwidth-intensive applicationslike video conferencing. While the 802.11 b standard now dominates theWLAN market, other variations of the 802.11 standard, such as 802.11 a,802.11g, and 802.1X, are being developed to handle increased speeds.WLAN vendors have committed to supporting a variety of standards. Thevarious 802.11 standards developed by the IEEE are available fordownload via URL: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html;these various standards are hereby incorporated by this referenceherein.

[0019] As businesses connected their LANs to the Internet 160, theyinstalled firewalls 145 to protect their local networks and act assecurity gates to fend off unauthorized traffic coming from theInternet's information highway such as potential hacker 135. Themobility of air-bound, wireless networks creates security concerns wherethreats can come from any direction and are not limited to the wiredinfrastructure. Established security practices of guarding a few wiredentry points to the network are no longer effective. A firewall 145 mayeffectively deter an attack from a wired hacker 135 via the Internet160; however, wireless hackers 195A, 195B typically enter the LAN 190through access points 180A, 180B that are already behind the firewall145. Companies must constantly monitor their airwaves to survey wirelessactivity and guard against intruders.

[0020] Because wireless communication is broadcast over radio waves,eavesdroppers 195A, 195B who merely listen to the airwaves can easilypick up unencrypted messages. Additionally, messages encrypted with theWired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security protocol can be decrypted with alittle time and easily available hacking tools. These passive intrudersput businesses at risk of exposing sensitive information to corporateespionage.

[0021] The theft of an authorized user's identity poses one the greatestthreats. Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) that act as crude passwords andMedia Access Control (MAC) addresses that act as personal identificationnumbers are often used to verify that clients are authorized to connectwith an access point. However, existing encryption standards are notfoolproof and allow knowledgeable intruders to pick up approved SSIDsand MAC addresses to connect to a WLAN as an authorized user with theability to steal bandwidth, corrupt or download files, and wreak havocon the entire network.

[0022] Outsiders who cannot gain access to a WLAN can none-the-less posesecurity threats by jamming or flooding the airwaves with static noisethat causes WLAN signals to collide and produce CRC errors. TheseDenial-of-Service (DoS) attacks effectively shut down the wirelessnetwork in a similar way that DoS attacks affect wired networks.

[0023] Careless and deceitful actions by both loyal and disgruntledemployees also present security risks and performance issues to wirelessnetworks with unauthorized access points, improper security measures,and network abuses. Because a simple WLAN can be easily installed byattaching a $150 access point to a wired network and a $100 WLAN card toa laptop, employees are deploying unauthorized WLANs or peer-to-peerwireless connections 175 when IT departments are slow to adopt the newtechnology.

[0024] Incorrectly configured access points are an avoidable butsignificant hole in WLAN security. Many access points are initiallyconfigured to broadcast unencrypted SSIDs of authorized users. WhileSSIDs are intended to be passwords to verify authorized users, intruderscan easily steal an unencrypted SSID to assume the identity of anauthorized user.

[0025] Authorized users can also threaten the integrity of the networkwith abuses that drain connection speeds, consume bandwidth, and hindera WLAN's overall performance. A few users who clog the network bytrading large files such as MP3 audio or MPEG video files can affect theproductivity of everyone on the wireless network.

[0026] The systems and methods according to the present inventionprovide solutions to these and other security and/or management issuesassociated with WLANs and/or encrypted computer networks.

SUMMARY

[0027] The present invention is directed to systems and methods forenhancing network security. One preferred embodiment according to thepresent invention includes a system data store (SDS), a system processorand one or more interfaces to one or more communications channels whichmay include one or more interfaces to wireless and/or encryptedcommunications network over which electronic communications aretransmitted and received. The SDS stores data needed to provide thedesired system functionality and may include, for example, receivedcommunications, data associated with such communications, informationrelated to known security risks and predetermined responses to theidentification of particular security risks and situations. The SDS mayinclude multiple physical and/or logical data stores for storing thevarious types of information. Data storage and retrieval functionalitymay be provided by either the system processor or data storageprocessors associated with the data store.

[0028] The system processor is in communication with the SDS via anysuitable communication channel(s); the system processor is incommunication with the one or more interfaces via the same, ordiffering, communication channel(s). The system processor may includeone or more processing elements that provide electronic communicationreception, transmission, interrogation, analysis and/or otherfunctionality.

[0029] Each interface to a wireless network includes at least onereceiver adapted to receive wireless communications; each interface mayalso, or instead, include one or more transmitters adapted to transmitwireless communications. Each interface to a wired network, if any,include a receiver, a transmitter, both or a plurality of one and/orboth; such receivers and/or transmitters are adapted to receive ortransmit communication over the wired network to which the interfaceconnects. In one preferred embodiment, the communication interfaceincludes at least one wireless transmitter.

[0030] Accordingly, one preferred method of security enhancementincludes a variety of steps that may, in certain embodiments, beexecuted by the environment summarized above and more fully describedbelow or be stored as computer executable instructions in and/or on anysuitable combination of computer-readable media. An active defenserequest signal is received. The active defense request signal includesan indicator corresponding to an access point within the wirelesscomputer network that is potentially compromised by an intruder. Inresponse to the received signal, one or more active defense aretriggered. In some preferred embodiments, the active defenses includejamming, CRC error generation, random frame transmission, networklock-down and/or dynamic channel change.

[0031] In some embodiments supporting dynamic channel change, a honeypottrap variation can be included. In such embodiments, a honeypot trap maybe activated culminating in a channel change request to the potentiallycompromised access point. Configuration data associated with an accesspoint on a wireless computer network potentially compromised by anintruder is received. Information contained within and/or derived fromthe received configuration data is stored. Communication with theintruder is continued by emulating the identification characteristics ofthe potentially compromised access point. In some embodiments,communication may appear to come from an access point that appears lesssecure than the potentially compromised access point. A channel changerequest is transmitted to the potentially compromised access point toreroute communication between the potentially compromised access pointand authorized stations may continue to a different channel.

[0032] In some embodiments, the active defense request signal isreceived from an intrusion detection system such as described in greaterdetail below. In such embodiments, the indicator of the potentiallycompromised access point can be included as part of a generated activedefense request signal. In other instances, an alarm signal is receivedthat triggers the generation and transmission of a request forinformation regarding the potentially compromised access point. Someembodiments involving an intrusion detection system may include theintrusion detection system while others just respond to input from sucha system.

[0033] Some embodiments further include the mapping of theidentification of the intruder's node and/or the mapping of the locationof the intruder's node within the wireless network. In some instances, anotification of the triggering of the active defense can be sent to anadministrator; some such notifications may include an identificationand/or location of the node associated with the intruder in embodimentsthat include node identification and location mapping.

[0034] In some embodiments, the configuration data includes one or morerisk criteria, network default data, network policy, performance and/orusage data. This configuration information may be received from one ormore of a variety of sources including from a configuration file, aninteractive data entry interface or a command line or from monitoringthe wireless computer network.

[0035] Some embodiments may further include updating of various types ofstored information; different embodiment may update all, none or anycombination of the various types of stored information. For instance,some embodiments can update station information associated with thevarious stations in the wireless computer network based upon thereceived data. Further, some embodiments can update state informationregarding the security of the wireless computer network based upon thereceived data. In addition, some embodiments can update statistics basedupon the received data. Such updates can occur each time data isreceived, in response to reaching a fixed amount of such update data, inresponse to reaching a fixed time or the end of a predeterminedduration, or some combination of these approaches.

[0036] Additional advantages of the invention will be set forth in partin the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from thedescription, or may be learned by practice of the invention. Theadvantages of the invention will be realized and attained by means ofthe elements and combinations particularly pointed out in the appendedclaims. It is to be understood that both the foregoing generaldescription and the following detailed description are exemplary andexplanatory only and are not restrictive of the invention, as claimed.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0037] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in andconstitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of theinvention and together with the description, serve to explain theprinciples of the invention.

[0038]FIG. 1 graphically depicts a typical LAN with both wired andwireless components.

[0039] FIGS. 2A-E graphically depicts LANs incorporating variouspreferred embodiments according to the present invention.

[0040]FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a multi-dimensional wireless intrusiondetection process according to one preferred embodiment of the presentinvention.

[0041]FIG. 4 is a flow chart of an example multiple input wirelessintrusion detection process including multiple input correlation andlong-term data fusion.

[0042]FIG. 5 is a flow chart of an exemplary dynamic channel changeactive defense process that includes a honeypot trap.

[0043] FIGS. 6A-B are flow charts of example station identification andlocation mapping processes.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] Exemplary embodiments of the present invention are now describedin detail. Referring to the drawings, like numbers indicate like partsthroughout the views. As used in the description herein and throughoutthe claims that follow, the meaning of “a,” “an,” and “the” includesplural reference unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. Also, asused in the description herein and throughout the claims that follow,the meaning of “in” includes “in” and “on” unless the context clearlydictates otherwise. Finally, as used in the description herein andthroughout the claims that follow, the meanings of “and” and “or”include both the conjunctive and disjunctive and may be usedinterchangeably unless the context clearly dictates otherwise; thephrase “exclusive or” may be used to indicate situation where only thedisjunctive meaning may apply.

[0045] Ranges may be expressed herein as from “about” one particularvalue, and/or to “about” another particular value. When such a range isexpressed, another embodiment includes from the one particular valueand/or to the other particular value. Similarly, when values areexpressed as approximations, by use of the antecedent “about,” it willbe understood that the particular value forms another embodiment. Itwill be further understood that the endpoints of each of the ranges aresignificant both in relation to the other endpoint, and independently ofthe other endpoint.

[0046] The term “Wi-Fi” is short for wireless fidelity and is anothername for IEEE 802.11b. The foregoing discussion of exemplary embodimentsmay use terminology or make reference to the IEEE 802.11 b standard, orother 802.11 variant; however, those skilled in the art will appreciatethat systems and methods of the present invention may be applied toWLANs meeting these standards as well as WLANs developed according tocompeting WLAN standards. The phrase “frame” as used herein shall meanbroadly any discretely defined communication transmitted via a computernetwork and shall not be limited to those specific frame types (control,management, data and error) defined according to 802.11X standards.

[0047] Architecture of a Typical Access Environment

[0048] FIGS. 2A-E depicts several LAN environments including severalpreferred embodiments according to the present invention. These figuresdepict a typical LAN environment as depicted in FIG. 1 having wired andwireless components. In contrast to FIG. 1, FIGS. 2A-E include one ormore hardware components supporting preferred embodiments according tothe present invention. The depicted hardware components include a systemprocessor, an SDS and one or more interfaces to one or more wirelessand/or encrypted communications network over which electroniccommunications are transmitted and received.

[0049] The hardware components depicted in these figures are outlined asfollows:

[0050] In FIG. 2A, the hardware components include a single device 210Athat includes the a local processor serving as the system processor andthe one or more interfaces to the wireless network. The device 210A ispreferably a mobile computer system such as a notebook computer. Thelocal primary and/or secondary storage of device 210A may serve as theSDS; alternatively, portions of the SDS may be provided by other systemscapable of communicating with the device 210A such as networkaddressable data storage 110, local servers 120 and/or wireless stations170A, 170B. In some embodiments, the device's interfaces to the wirelessnetwork may be limited to one or more wireless receivers. In otherembodiments, the interfaces may include one or more wirelesstransmitters as well as one or more transmitters. If wirelesstransmitters are included, the device 210 may communicate over LAN 190using a wireless access point 180A, 180B. In addition, included wirelesstransmitters may be used to support one or more of the active defensemeasures described in greater detail below. In some embodiments, thedevice 210A may further include a wired connection (not shown) toEthernet 150 allowing direct communication between it and systemsconnected to the wired portion of LAN 190.

[0051] In FIG. 2B, the hardware components include multiple devices210A, 210B, 210C, 210D. Each device 210A-D includes a local processorand one or more interfaces to the wireless network and is preferably amobile computer system such as a notebook computer. The individual localprocessors in the aggregate serve as the system processor. The SDS mayinclude a combination of storage local to each of the devices and/orexternal storage accessible via the LAN 190. As described above withrespect to FIG. 2A, each device includes at least a wireless receiverbut may also include additional wireless receivers and/or wirelesstransmitters. Each device may also include a wired connection (notshown) to Ethernet 150. Finally, the devices 210A-D may further useexisting interfaces and/or incorporate additional interfaces to allowpeer-to-peer communication among themselves.

[0052] In FIG. 2C, the hardware components include multiple devices210A, 210B, 210C, 210D, 220. Each device 210A-D may include the variouscomponents as described above with respect to FIG. 2B. Device 220includes a local processor and one or more communication interfaces;this device may be referred to hereinafter as the host system. Device220's communication interfaces may include only a wired communicationinterface and may receive data related to wireless communications asforwarded by devices 210A-D over the wire Ethernet 150. In addition to,or instead of, the wired communication interface, device 220 may includea one or more wireless communication interfaces each of which mayinclude a wireless receiver, a wireless transmitter or both. Inembodiment where devices 210A-D support peer-to-peer communication,device 220 may in some of such embodiments participate in thepeer-to-peer communication and, in such instances, its communicationinterfaces would include the appropriate communication interface tosupport this participation. The system processor functionality in thedepicted embodiment may be provided by the host system alone and/or bysome combination of the devices 210A-D. The host system may in someembodiments provide the SDS for the environment; alternatively, the SDSmay be supported by some combination of the local storage among thedevices 210A-D, the local storage in the host system and externalstorage available through LAN 190.

[0053] In FIG. 2D, the hardware components include multiple devices210A, 210B, 210C, 210D, 220, 230A, 230B. Devices 210A-D, 220 support thesame functionality and include the same range of components as providedabove with respect to FIG. 2C. In addition, devices 230A, 230B aresensor devices that monitor wireless traffic over the wireless network.These sensor devices at least include a wireless receiver for monitoringthe traffic and a communication interface wired (as depicted) orwireless (not shown) allowing communication with one or more of thedevices 210A-D and/or the host system 220. In some embodiments, thesensor devices 230A, 230B may include a wireless transmitter forsupporting communication with the other hardware components and/or forsupporting various active wireless network defensive measures asdiscussed below. In some embodiments, the sensor device 230A, 230B mayfurther include local processing capability and or local storagecapability; in some such embodiments, the system processor and/or theSDS may incorporate these local capabilities of the sensor devices 230A,230B.

[0054] In FIG. 2E, the hardware components include multiple devices 220,230A, 230B. In this embodiment, the host system 220 and sensor devices230A, 230B include the same functionality and range of components asdiscussed above with respect to FIGS. 2D and 2E respectively. In suchembodiments, the host system 220 will typically provide a significantportion of the system processor functionality and will only have limitedcapacity to directly receive wireless network communication. In some ofthese embodiments, the host system 220 may have no wirelesscommunication interface.

[0055] The depicted hardware components include a system processorpotentially including multiple processing elements, that may bedistributed across the depicted hardware components, where eachprocessing element may be supported via Intel-compatible processorplatforms preferably using at least one PENTIUM III or CELERON (IntelCorp., Santa Clara, Calif.) class processor; alternative processors suchas UltraSPARC (Sun Microsystems, Palo Alto, Calif.) could be used inother embodiments. In some embodiments, security enhancementfunctionality, as further described below, may be distributed acrossmultiple processing elements. The term processing element may refer to(1) a process running on a particular piece, or across particularpieces, of hardware, (2) a particular piece of hardware, or either (1)or (2) as the context allows. The sensor devices 230A, 230B depicted inFIGS. 2D-E may in some preferred embodiments include more limitedoptimized local processors such as a digital signal processor (DSP).Other embodiment can use application specific integrated circuits (ASIC)or a field programmable gate arrays (FPGA).

[0056] The depicted hardware components include an SDS that couldinclude a variety of primary and secondary storage elements. In onepreferred embodiment, the SDS would include RAM as part of the primarystorage; the amount of RAM might range from 64 MB to 4 GB in eachindividual hardware device although these amounts could vary andrepresent overlapping use such as where the host system 220 supportsadditional functionality such as integrated with firewall system 145 forproviding unified wired and wireless security. The primary storage mayin some embodiments include other forms of memory such as cache memory,registers, non-volatile memory (e.g., FLASH, ROM, EPROM, etc.), etc. Thesensor devices 230A, 230B depicted in FIGS. 2D-E may in some preferredembodiments include more limited amounts and kinds of primary storage.In one preferred embodiments, the primary storage in the sensor devicesincludes FLASH memory.

[0057] The SDS may also include secondary storage including single,multiple and/or varied servers and storage elements. For example, theSDS may use internal storage devices connected to the system processor.In embodiments where a single processing element supports all of thesecurity analysis functionality, such as seen in FIGS. 2A and 2E, alocal hard disk drive may serve as the secondary storage of the SDS, anda disk operating system executing on such a single processing elementmay act as a data server receiving and servicing data requests.

[0058] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that thedifferent information used in the security enhancement processes andsystems according to the present invention may be logically orphysically segregated within a single device serving as secondarystorage for the SDS; multiple related data stores accessible through aunified management system, which together serve as the SDS; or multipleindependent data stores individually accessible through disparatemanagement systems, which may in some embodiments be collectively viewedas the SDS. The various storage elements that comprise the physicalarchitecture of the SDS may be centrally located, or distributed acrossa variety of diverse locations.

[0059] The architecture of the secondary storage of the system datastore may vary significantly in different embodiments. In severalembodiments, database(s) are used to store and manipulate the data; insome such embodiments, one or more relational database managementsystems, such as DB2 (IBM, White Plains, NY), SQL Server (Microsoft,Redmond, Wash.), ACCESS (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.), ORACLE 8i (OracleCorp., Redwood Shores, Calif.), Ingres (Computer Associates, Islandia,N.Y.), MySQL (MySQL AB, Sweden) or Adaptive Server Enterprise (SybaseInc., Emeryville, Calif.), may be used in connection with a variety ofstorage devices/file servers that may include one or more standardmagnetic and/or optical disk drives using any appropriate interfaceincluding, without limitation, IDE and SCSI. In some embodiments, a tapelibrary such as Exabyte X80 (Exabyte Corporation, Boulder, Colo.), astorage attached network (SAN) solution such as available from (EMC,Inc., Hopkinton, Mass.), a network attached storage (NAS) solution suchas a NetApp Filer 740 (Network Appliances, Sunnyvale, Calif.), orcombinations thereof may be used. In other embodiments, the data storemay use database systems with other architectures such asobject-oriented, spatial, object-relational or hierarchical.

[0060] Instead of, or in addition to, those organization approachesdiscussed above, certain embodiments may use other storageimplementations such as hash tables or flat files or combinations ofsuch architectures. Such alternative approaches may use data serversother than database management systems such as a hash table look-upserver, procedure and/or process and/or a flat file retrieval server,procedure and/or process. Further, the SDS may use a combination of anyof such approaches in organizing its secondary storage architecture.

[0061] The hardware components may each have an appropriate operatingsystem such as WINDOWS/NT, WINDOWS 2000 or WINDOWS/XP Server (Microsoft,Redmond, Wash.), Solaris (Sun Microsystems, Palo Alto, Calif.), or LINUX(or other UNIX variant). In one preferred embodiment, the devices 210A-Dand/or host system 220 include a LINUX (or other UNIX variant) operatingsystem; although other embodiments may include a WINDOWS/XP (or otherWINDOWS family) operating system.

[0062] Depending upon the hardware/operating system platform of theoverall environment, appropriate server software may be included tosupport the desired access for the purpose of configuration, monitoringand/or reporting. Web server functionality may be provided via anInternet Information Server (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.), an Apache HTTPServer (Apache Software Foundation, Forest Hill, Md.), an iplanet WebServer (iPlanet E-Commerce Solutions—A Sun—Netscape Alliance, MountainView, Calif.) or other suitable Web server platform. The e-mail servicesmay be supported via an Exchange Server (Microsoft, Redmond, Wash.),sendmail or other suitable e-mail server. Some embodiments may includeone or more automated voice response (AVR) systems that are in additionto, or instead of, the aforementioned access servers. Such an AVR systemcould support a purely voice/telephone driven interface to theenvironment with hard copy output delivered electronically to suitablehard copy output device (e.g., printer, facsimile, etc.), and forward asnecessary through regular mail, courier, inter-office mail, facsimile orother suitable forwarding approach.

[0063] In one preferred embodiment, devices 210A-D and host system 220can be configured locally or remotely, and configuration can occurthrough an interactive interface and/or through a command lineinterface. The interactive interface is accessible locally whereas thecommand line interface is accessible either locally or remotely. Remoteaccess is preferably granted through the use of a secure shell (SSH)client communicating with an SSH server running on the device or hostsystem.

[0064] In some preferred embodiments of the present invention, aninteractive interface is provided for configuring the access point andvarious hardware components and supplying a variety of configurationdata including thresholds values of various kinds. In one preferredembodiment, an administration program area provides such an interfaceand allows:

[0065] definition and configuration of access point settings andpolicies;

[0066] creation and/or designation of thresholds used to triggerintrusion/detection alarms for authorized access points;

[0067] creation and/or designation of default thresholds used to triggerintrusion/detection alarms for non-authorized access points; and

[0068] configuration of settings for the various hardware/softwarecomponents.

[0069] The administration program area, in one preferred embodiment,offers standard windowing interface featuring tabbed pages for easynavigation between configuration functions. From within each of thetabbed pages, an Edit button allows modification of the values. Afterediting the data, Accept temporarily saves the changes. Commitpermanently saves and applies edits (until edited again). Acceptedchanges persist until the system is restarted whereas committed changespersist until across restarts.

[0070] Access Point Configuration

[0071] One preferred embodiment automatically attempts to detect andrecord all the configured properties for all access points it observes.The settings constitute access point “policies”—when access pointproperties deviate from those recorded, one or more alarms can begenerated. The values for an access point can be modified manually toalter the generation of specific alarms. Policies for off-line accesspoints can also be created in some embodiments using an Add feature. Thetable below provides a summary of several access point propertiesdisplayable and/or configurable in some preferred embodiments of thepresent invention. Values Description Access Point ID The MAC address ofthe access point. Access Point Name The user-defined name of the accesspoint. Extended Service The name of the Extended Service Set indicatingSet ID the wireless network to which the access point belongs. AccessPoint The manufacturer of the access point. In some em- Vendorbodiments, this is detected by comparing the first three bytes of itsMAC address with a database of OUI numbers. Supported Rates The datatransfer rates the access point supports. In some embodiments, thisvalue (or these values) can be edited to specify the supported rates.Authentication Whether the access point accepts non-authenticated Modesnetwork connections and/or also accepts shared key authentication. (Ifconnections are detected that deviate from either of these settings, analarm can be generated.) Configured to Run Whether or not the accesspoint is configured to re- WEP quire WEP encryption. AP Mgmt FromWhether the access point is configured to allow Wireless Network usersto directly administer its settings over the wireless network.Authorized Access Whether this access point is authorized to be presentPoint in the air space. Unauthorized access points, when detected, cangenerate alarms. (In some embodi- ment, a change in this value will nottake effect until the system is restarted.)

[0072] For each access point, a station maintenance screen or menu mayallow the specification of the stations that are authorized to use it.One preferred embodiment of such a screen or menu, automatically detectsall stations within the footprint of the access point's Basic ServiceSet (BSS) and enters their MAC addresses in an Observed column. Suchstations can be indicated as an authorized member of the BSS byselecting them in the Observed column and designating them as Valid.Designated stations are moved to a Valid column. (Stations can, in someembodiments, be designated as invalid by selecting and marking them inthe Valid column.) Stations not auto-detected can be manually entered byspecifying its MAC address in a Enter New Station input field andtriggering an Add Station feature.

[0073] Access Point Threshold Configuration and Aggregate StationThresholds

[0074] Systems and methods according to the present invention generatealerts if network traffic that exceeds thresholds is detected. In onepreferred embodiment, all 15 detected or manually configured off-lineaccess points are listed in a Select AP pick list. Thresholds associatedwith each access point in the pick list can be edited by selecting theparticular access point. Such threshold values can be either temporary(until the next restart) or persistent across restarts (until a furtheredit designated as persistent). Values Description Signal Strength Ifthe signal strength for any station in the BSS is Threshold lower thanthis value, an alarm can be generated. # of Associations Enter themaximum number of associations per minute per Minute to allow with allstations combined. (Preferably, this value is not higher than twice thenumber of stations in the BSS.) # of Associated Enter the maximum numberof stations allowed to Stations associate at any one time with thisaccess point. The number should reflect the actual number of stations.If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.

[0075] The following table outlines a set of thresholds used in onepreferred embodiment that refer to the network characteristicsencompassing all stations and traffic in the BSS. In one preferredembodiment, special care must be taken when creating the “bytethresholds” that immediately follow. Several factors govern the valuesentered for each:

[0076] The “transmission rate” of the access point—how much data it cantransmit—is the first consideration. If the transmission rate is only 1megabyte per second, the thresholds will be much lower than if thetransmission rate is 11 megabytes per second.

[0077] All four “directions” of traffic (wired to wired, wired towireless, wireless to wired, and wireless to wireless) must add up toless than 100% of available bandwidth. Many administrators will set theindividual thresholds such that their combined value is less than 80% ofavailable bandwidth. Value Description # Bytes into Enter the maximumnumber of bytes of data per minute BSS from allowed into the BSS fromthe wired portion of your Wired Net network. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. # Bytes from Enter the maximumnumber of bytes of data per minute BSS to Wired allowed out of the BSSto a wired portion of your Net network. If a greater number is detected,an alarm can be generated. # Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes ofdata per minute between allowed to be transmitted within the BSS fromall sta- Stations in tions. If a greater number is detected, an alarmcan be BSS generated. # Bytes from Enter the maximum number of bytes ofdata per minute Wired Net to allowed to be transmitted from a wiredportion of the Wired Net network to another wired portion of thenetwork, using the access point as a bridge. If a greater number is de-tected, an alarm can be generated. Total Data Enter the maximum numberof data frames per minute Frames Seen from all stations combined allowedto be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. Total Mgmt Enter the maximum number of management frames perFrames Seen minute from all stations combined allowed to be trans-mitted. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.Total Ctrl Enter the maximum number of control frames per minute FramesSeen from all stations combined allowed to be transmitted. If a greaternumber is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Ad hoc Enter themaximum number of ad hoc frames per minute Frames Seen from all stationscombined allowed to be transmitted. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be generated.

[0078] Individual Station Thresholds

[0079] The following table outlines a set of potential thresholdsapplied to any individual station in one preferred embodiment. If anysingle station reaches one of these thresholds, an alarm can begenerated. Column Description Signal Strength If the signal strength forany station in the BSS is Threshold lower than this value, an alarm canbe generated. # of Associations Enter the maximum number of associationsper min- per Minute ute any station is allowed to make with an accesspoint. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # ofBytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per Transmitted minuteany station is allowed transmit. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be generated. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes ofdata per Received minute any station is allowed to receive. If a greaternumber is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Data Frames Enterthe maximum number of data frames per min- Transmitted ute any stationis allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames permin- Received ute any station is allowed to receive. If a greater numberis detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter themaximum number of management frames Transmitted per minute any stationis allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begener- ated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number of managementframes Received per minute any station is allowed to receive. If agreater number is detected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of CtrlFrames Enter the maximum number of control frames per Transmitted minuteany station is allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be gener- ated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number ofcontrol frames per Received minute any station is allowed to receive. Ifa greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of FragmentEnter the maximum number of fragment frames per Frames Seen minute fromany station that are allowed. If a greater number is detected, an alarmcan be generated. # of Decrypt Error Enter the maximum number of decrypterror frames Frames Seen per minute from any station that are allowed.If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be gener- ated.

[0080] Access Point Station Thresholds

[0081] The following table outlines a set of thresholds, in onepreferred embodiment, applied to the access point itself, and willtypically be somewhat more than the Aggregate Station thresholds. ColumnDescription Signal Strength If the signal strength for any frame islower than Threshold this value, an alarm can be generated. # ofAssociations Whereas stations must associate with an access per Minutepoint, access points do not associate with them- selves. Therefore, thisvalue should be zero, indicating that it does not associate. # of BytesEnter the maximum number of bytes of data per Transmitted minute thisaccess point is allowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be gener- ated. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytesof data per Received minute this access point is allowed to receive. Ifa greater number is detected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of DataFrames Enter the maximum number of data frames per min- Transmitted utethis access point is allowed to transmit. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of Data Frames Enter themaximum number of data frames per min- Received ute this access point isallowed to receive. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begener- ated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number of managementframes Transmitted per minute this access point is allowed to transmit.If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of MgmtFrames Enter the maximum number of management frames Received per minutethis access point is allowed to receive. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximumnumber of control frames per Transmitted minute this access point isallowed to transmit. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begener- ated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control framesper Received minute this access point is allowed to receive. If agreater number is detected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of FragmentEnter the maximum number of fragment frames per Frames Seen minute thisaccess point can see before gener- ating an alarm. # of Decrypt ErrorEnter the maximum number of decrypt error frames Frames Seen per minutethis access point can see before gener- ating an alarm.

[0082] Default Threshold Information

[0083] In one preferred embodiment, whenever a new access point isdetected or manually entered, the specified default settings are applieduntil it is manually customized. It is assumed that new or unauthorizedaccess points are potential hackers, so it is preferable to set thedefault thresholds fairly low.

[0084] Aggregate Station Thresholds

[0085] The table below outlines a set of thresholds that refer to thecombined statistics for all stations in one preferred embodiment. ColumnDescription Signal Strength If the signal strength for any station inthe BSS as- Threshold sociated with an unknown access point is lowerthan this value, an alarm can be generated. # of Associations Whereasstations must associate with an access point, per Minute access pointsdo not associate with themselves. There- fore, this value should bezero, indicating that it does not associate. # of Associated Enter themaximum number of stations allowed to as- Stations sociate with unknownacccss points. The number should reflect your actual stations. If agreater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # Bytes into BSSEnter the maximum number of bytes of data per min- from Wired Net uteallowed into the BSS through unknown access points from the wiredportion of your network. If a greater number is detected, an alarm canbe generated. # Bytes from Enter the maximum number of bytes of data permin- BSS to Wired ute allowed out of the BSS through unknown access Netpoints to a wired portion of your network. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. # Bytes between Enter the maximumnumber of bytes of data per min- Stations in BSS ute allowed to betransmitted within the BSS from all stations through unknown accesspoints. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. #Bytes from Enter the maximum number of bytes of data per min- Wired Netto ute allowed to be transmitted through unknown access Wired Net pointsfrom a wired portion of the network to another wired portion of thenetwork, using the access point as a bridge. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. Total Data Enter the maximum numberof data frames per minute Frames Seen for all stations combined allowedto be transmitted through unknown access points. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. Total Mgmt Enter the maximum numberof management frames per Frames Seen minute for all stations combinedallowed to be trans- mitted through unknown access points. If a greaternumber is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Ctrl Frames Enterthe maximum number of control frames per min- Seen ute for all stationscombined allowed to be trans- mitted through unknown access points. If agreater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. Total Ad hocEnter the maximum number of ad hoc frames per min- Frames Seen ute forall stations combined allowed to be trans- mitted through unknown accesspoints. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated.

[0086] Individual Station Thresholds

[0087] The set of thresholds outlined in the table below apply to anyindividual station in one preferred embodiment, and will typically belower than the Aggregate Station thresholds. Column Description SignalStrength If the signal strength for any station associated Thresholdwith an unknown access point is lower than this value, an alarm can begenerated. # of Associations Enter the maximum number of associationsper min- per Minute ute any station is allowed to make with an unknownaccess point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data perTransmitted minute any station is allowed transmit through unknownaccess points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data perReceived minute any station is allowed to receive through unknown accesspoints. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm can be generated. #of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames per min-Transmitted ute any station is allowed to transmit through un- knownaccess points. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames permin- Received ute any station is allowed to receive through un- knownaccess points. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number of managementframes Transmitted per minute any station is allowed to transmit throughunknown access points. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number of managementframes Received per minute any station is allowed to receive throughunknown access points. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm canbe generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of controlframes per Transmitted minute any station is allowed to transmit throughunknown access points. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm canbe generated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of controlframes per Received minute any station is allowed to receive throughunknown access points. If a greater number is de- tected, an alarm canbe generated. # of Fragment Enter the maximum number of fragment framesper Frames Seen minute from any station that are allowed. If a greaternumber is detected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of Decrypt ErrorEnter the maximum number of decrypt error frames Frames Seen per minutefrom any station that are allowed. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be gener- ated.

Access Point Station Thresholds

[0088] The set of thresholds in the table below applies to allunauthorized access points in one preferred embodiment. ColumnDescription Signal Strength If the signal strength for any access pointis lower Threshold than this value, an alarm can be generated. # ofAssociations Enter the maximum number of associations per min- perMinute ute between any access point and stations. (It is recommendedthat this value not be higher than twice the number of stations in yourBSS.) # of Bytes Enter the maximum number of bytes of data perTransmitted minute allowed to be transmitted from any access point. If agreater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of Bytes Enterthe maximum number of bytes of data per Received minute allowed to bereceived by any access point. If a greater number is detected, an alarmcan be generated. # of Data Frames Enter the maximum number of dataframes per min- Transmitted ute allowed to be transmitted by any Accesspoint. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # ofData Frames Enter the maximum number of data frames per min- Receivedute allowed to be received by any access point. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be gener- ated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter themaximum number of management frames Transmitted per minute allowed to betransmitted by any access point. If a greater number is detected, analarm can be generated. # of Mgmt Frames Enter the maximum number ofmanagement frames Received per minute allowed to be received by anyaccess point. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can begenerated. # of Ctrl Frames Enter the maximum number of control framesper Transmitted minute allowed to be transmitted by any access point. Ifa greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # of CtrlFrames Enter the maximum number of control frames per Received minuteallowed to be received by any access point. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated. # of Fragment Enter the maximumnumber of fragment frames per Frames Seen minute allowed for any accesspoint. If a greater number is detected, an alarm can be generated. # ofDecrypt Error Enter the maximum number of decrypt error frames FramesSeen per minute allowed for any access point. If a greater number isdetected, an alarm can be generated.

[0089] Some embodiments may allow for self-configuration of some or allof the thresholds discussed above. Such self-configuration could occurthrough a learning mode in which the systems and methods according o thepresent invention monitor traffic on the wireless computer network forthe first several hours or days after installation. In such a learningmode, alarm notifications can be disabled. It is expected that, in thebeginning, the generation of alarms will be very high—hundreds orthousands per day depending on actual network traffic—until thresholdsin accordance with the network's normal activity. Once an accuratepicture of normal network traffic has been captured, and thresholds arereflective of normal activity, a switch to normal operations modeenables alarm notifications.

[0090] In one preferred embodiment, a command line interface is providedto configure settings that are not available within the graphical userinterface. For example, the IP address of the a hardware component canbe changed, its system clock reset or set to “sync” with a network timeserver. In other embodiments, the graphical user interface and/or thecommand line interface can allow significant overlap of configurationcapability. Further, some embodiments have only one or the otherinterface type. Finally, some embodiments provide no interactiveinterface for configuration and are limited to reading configurationdata from a file, deriving configuration data from past monitoring ofthe wireless computer network or otherwise receiving this data. Thecommand line interface in one preferred embodiment can be accessedeither on the hardware component such as through a command shell such asthe Linux Gnome Terminal or over the network using an SSH (preferably,version 2) client.

[0091] In one preferred embodiment, a command shell automatically openson the hardware component after booting. A terminal icon can appear onthe task bar at the bottom of the display; clicking the icon opensadditional terminal windows. At the command line prompt, a command isentered to launch the command line interface.

[0092] An SSH client is launched and connected to the hardwarecomponent's IP address. The identity of the user making the connectionis verified. At the command line prompt, enter the following command tolaunch the command line interface:

[0093] Command Line Interface

[0094] In one preferred embodiment, the screen displays in the terminalwindow provide five “program areas”:

[0095] Network—offering options to change IP address, DNS servers,hostname, domain name, mail server, ARP, and create “allow” and “deny”lists.

[0096] Date—allowing time and date editing, time zone setting, andconfiguration of an NTP server.

[0097] Service—providing tools to fine-tune the hardware componentparameters, configure data management, and reboot and shut down thecomponent.

[0098] Users—allowing creation, editing, and deletion of user accountsallowed access to the graphical user interface.

[0099] Help—tips on using the application, and detailed help topics.

[0100] Network

[0101] Opening the network settings program area, the following commandsare available in one preferred embodiment: Command Description IP IPaddress config Allows modification of the IP address, Subnet mask, andde- fault gateway for the hardware component logged onto. The “IPconfiguration” screen opens, displaying the current networkconfiguration and allows modification. DNS Define DNS servers Adding ordeleting a DNS nameserver. The “Nameserver screen” opens, displayingyour current DNS server's IP address and allows addition, deletion andmodifi- cation. Note: Multiple DNS servers can in some embodiments havean “order” for processing DNS requests. The first server on the list(identified by the numeral 1) is the first to offer name resolution; thesecond server on the list (identified by the numeral 2) is the second toprocess the request if the first is unable to do so. In order to changethe order preference of multiple servers, all must be deleted andre-entered in the de- sired order for them to process DNS requests.HNAME Set hostname Changing the name of the hardware component. TheHostname screen displays your current hostname and allows modification.Bear in mind that whenever the hostname is changed, its name must alsobe modified in all devices that refer to it (e.g., DNS servers). DNAMESet domain name Changing the domain to which the hardware component be-longs. The Domain name screen displays your current domain name andallows modification. Bear in mind that whenever the domain name ischanged, it must also be modified in all devices that refer to it (e.g.,DNS servers). MRELAY Config mail relay host Configuring a hardwarecomponent to send alarms by email. The Mail relay host screen appearsand allows entry of quali- fied hostnames. In one embodiment, mail relayhosts may be referred to by IP address or fully qualified hostname(e.g., myhostname.mydomainname.com) of a mail server to process emailalarm messages. Note: the mail server must be configured to allow thisappli- ance to relay email through it, or at least to direct its mail toanother mail server that will relay it. ARP Config permanent ARP tableCreating a permanent ARP table. The ARP table screen dis- plays yourcurrent ARP records and allows modification. In order to protectconnections between this hardware com- ponent and remote administratorsfrom being hijacked by man-in-the-middle ARP “blasts” (that redirecttraffic for this IP address to an alternate MAC address), it ispreferable to create permanent ARP records for gateways and other impor-tant machines. HALLOW Configure/etc/hosts.allow file Specifying whichmachines are allowed to connect to the hardware component. The Allowlist screen displays your current list of allowed machines and allowsmodification. Machines allowed to connect to this hardware componentscan be specified. Only those whose IP address, subnet, fully qualifiedhostname, or domain name match an entry in this list are allowed toconnect to this hardware component to run the available administrativeprograms and routines. HDENY Config/etc/host.deny file Identifyingmachines that may not connect to the hardware component. The Deny listscreen displays your current list of denied machines and allowsmodification. Machines not allowed to connect to this hardware componentcan be specified. Anyone whose IP address, subnet, fully qualifiedhostname, or domain name matches an entry in this list are not allowedto connect to this hardware component Note: HALLOW, in one preferredembodiment, takes prec- edence over HDENY. For example, if123.456.789.963 is on the allow list, yet the subnet 123.456.789. is onthe deny list, the individual machine above is allowed to connect to theappliance.

[0102] Date

[0103] Opening the date settings program area, the following commandsare available in one preferred embodiment: Command Description TIMETime/Date config Allows configuration of the time/date for the hardwarecom- ponent. TZ Set time zone Allows configuration of the time zone forthe hardware com- ponent. NTP Enable/disable NTP Allows configuration ofthe hardware component to use a network time server. Note: If you changethe system time because, for example, you move the appliance's locationfrom the east to west coast of the United States, you must also locate anew net- work time server in the same time zone.

Services

[0104] Opening the set appliance parameters, configure data management,and restart or shutdown the system area, the following commands areavailable in one preferred embodiment: Command Description TUNE Tuneappliance parameters Allows users to modify some of the core valuesrelated to the environment's functionality. DMGT Data management Allowsusers to modify how the environment stores its data. REBOOT Rebootsystem Allows graceful restart of the hardware component. HALT Haltsystem Allows graceful shutdown of the hardware component.

[0105] Users

[0106] Opening the Users program area, the following commands areavailable in one preferred embodiment: Command Description NEWU Createuser EDITU Edit user DELU Delete user

[0107] The functionality of these features can in one preferredembodiment match with like functionality provided in a standard LINUXuser management facility.

[0108] Various methods and functions as exhibited in various embodimentsaccording to the present invention are described above and below withrespect to network security enhancement. In some embodiments, one ormore processors within architectures of the environments as describedabove may execute the steps in such methods and provide suchfunctionality. The functionality may spread across multiple processingelements. In other embodiments, any suitable computer readable storagedevice, media or combination of devices and/or media, including primarystorage such as RAM, ROM, cache memory, etc. or secondary storage suchas magnetic media including fixed and removable disks and tapes; opticalmedia including fixed and removable disks whether read-only orread-write; paper media including punch cards and paper tape; or othersecondary storage as would be known to those skilled in the art, maystore instruction that upon execution by one or more processors causethe one or more processors to execute the steps in such methods and toprovide such functionality.

[0109] Vulnerability Assessment and Threat Identification

[0110] Vulnerability assessment is accomplished by analyzing WLANtraffic, discovering access points and workstations. The systemdetermines how many bytes of data stations are sending and receiving,the mean signal strength for an entire day or the hi/low signal strengthfor each minute. It can distinguish between network traffic internal tothe wireless network and traffic originating from or destined to thephysical, wired-network and which stations are the largest senders andreceivers of data. The system produces broad summaries of data thatreport high, low, and mean values for a variety of traffic parameters,and detailed views that show minute-by-minute snapshots of your traffic.Traffic parameters include the breakdown of frame traffic (control,management, data, and error frames) and network routing information. Thesystem determines if any traffic has not been encrypted, users areauthenticated, and all hardware is properly configured. The systemdetects rogue deployments by identifying and locating unauthorized WLANsand ad hoc networks (peer-to-peer networks) that violate company policyand jeopardize security. The system identifies suspicious WLAN trafficacross unauthorized channels and frequencies, which can be a common signof intruders accessing your WLAN or employees abusing their networkprivileges.

[0111] The systems and methods according to one preferred embodiment usean audit of existing wireless hardware and perform a survey the airspace surrounding the wireless network prior to activating intrusiondetection. In this way, a baseline activity level can be determined.

[0112] Step 1: Hardware Audit

[0113] Identify every access point in the wireless computer network.Obtain or determine for each its MAC address, Extended Service Set name,manufacturer, supported transmission rates, authentication modes, andwhether or not it is configured to run Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)and wireless administrative management. In addition, identify everyworkstation equipped with a wireless network interface card, and recordthe MAC address of each device. Take note of any physical features inthe environment (walls, competing electronic devices such as microwaveovens, cordless phones, etc.) that might interfere with wirelesssignals.

[0114] The hardware audit serve as the baseline against which thesystems and methods according to the present invention can compare. Thatis, all access points and wireless stations should be detected by thevarious embodiments of the present invention. (If an access point orstation is not detected, follow logical troubleshooting steps.) On theother hand, it is likely that more devices than expected will bedetected. Some of these may be stations or access points not identifiedor of which no one was aware. Others may be “rogue”devices—surreptitious or unauthorized installations in the network—orharmless equipment belonging to nearby companies, and others may beactual hackers. Once the systems and methods according to the presentinvention are in intrusion detection mode, all detected access pointsand stations can be reported.

[0115] Step 2: Survey Perimeter

[0116] Preferably a mobile hardware component according to the presentinvention is walked around the perimeter of the wireless computernetwork in a powered up state (allowing it to collect data as it ismoved), or placed in a central location for 12 to 24 hours to collect alarger amount of data. The benefit of a “walk-around” survey is that itgenerates a nearly immediate picture of the existing wireless “airspace.” The benefit of a “istationary” survey is that over a longerperiod of time, is greater certainty of detecting devices that onlyoperate intermittently or hackers attempting to penetrate the networkoff-hours. Repetition of the survey, whether walking or stationary,should occur on all 11 channels.

[0117] Stationary Data Collection

[0118] Depending on the size of the wireless network, a hardwarecomponent can be placed at the four corners or at intermediate points inthe Extended Service Set footprint. At each location, the componentshould be allowed to passively monitor network traffic for 12-24 hours.Hard copy of network data should be preserved prior to each move.

[0119] Walk-Around Data Collection

[0120] Simply walk around the perimeter of the wireless network with thehardware component powered on and open to an overview screen. Thevarious access points and stations within the wireless computer networkcan be detected. Compare this information with the hardware audit madeprior to collecting this data. Repeat this walk-around survey for eachof the eleven channels.

[0121] Step 3: Configure to “Recognize ” this Network

[0122] Each access point detected should be designated as authorized orunauthorized. Each observed station should be designated as valid ornot.

[0123] Step 4: Place Hardware Components in Discrete Locationsthroughout the Wireless Network

[0124] Leave a component in each location from 1-3 days. Each day, printreports to preserve captured information. Based upon this information,specific access point and station related thresholds can be tuned todistinguish between normal and abnormal traffic patterns.

[0125] The intrusion detection system (IDS) engine listens to wirelessnetwork traffic. FIG. 3 depicts one preferred process the IDS follows inevaluating data associated with received traffic. In the depictedexemplary process, all packets pass through four detections systems:signature-based testing, protocol-based testing, anomaly-based testing,and policy deviation-based testing; other embodiments may use one ormore of these tests, or other tests, in varying combinations.

[0126] Initially, configuration information is received in step 305,typically including network default data and risk criteria. Thisinformation can be retrieved from a file, derived or obtained frommonitoring the network and/or entered interactively at the outset of theprocess. The, system reads or receives frames from the wireless networkinstep 310. The received frames are interrogated as follows.

[0127] The information within the frame is interrogated to determine ifa known attack signature has been identified in step 325. Signaturesencode datalink layer attack patters as combinations of packet sequencesand state. For example, active probing emits a pattern or sequence ofnetwork requests. This sequence can be recognized by its packet sequencesignature. If the attack signature is identified, the intrusiondetection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to theadministrator in step 345.

[0128] If no attack signature is identified, the frame information ispassed through a protocol violation engine to determine if the protocolused in the frame is authorized in step 330. Protocol analysis examineswhether or not protocol usage is legitimate. For example, emitting alarge number of association or disassociation requests in a shortinterval is not a legitimate use of the protocol. If the protocol usedin the frame is outside of the authorized protocol set, the intrusiondetection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to theadministrator in step 345.

[0129] If the protocol test passes, in step 335, the IDS checks theframe data for statistical anomalies against the SDS, or a statisticsdatabase maintained therein. Anomaly based detection computes suchvalues as the mean, non-zero mean, standard deviation, autocorrelationand peak for each time slice throughout the day. This can be used tocreate a normalized statistics database for each time slice and user.Current activity is then monitored and compared with the recordedstatistics vector. If the difference is larger than a configurablethreshold, an alert is generated. Instead of, or in addition to, thisapproach, a Bayes test can be applied to deduce the probability that thecurrent statistics vector is an attack as opposed to a legitimatesequence. If an anomaly exists, the intrusion detection system signalsan alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.

[0130] If no anomaly is detected, the system interrogates the frame todetermine if a pre-defined policy has been violated in step 340. Policytesting compares the observed activity with a configurable set ofactivity rules stored in the SDS. For example, a rule can declare thatonly specific hosts with specific addresses and specific network cardscan access the network. If a pre-defined policy has been violated, theintrusion detection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alertto the administrator in step 345.

[0131] The tests outlined above and depicted in FIG. 3 are performedserially. In other embodiments, one or more of these tests may occur inparallel. Further, subsequent tests only occur if a prior test waspassed. In a further preferred embodiment, all tests occur irrespectiveof the outcome of a prior test; consequently, a single read frame couldpotentially generate an alarm for every test performed on it.

[0132] Alerts can be in the any suitable form delivered to any suitableplatform including, without limitation, a screen display to a monitor, apage to a pager, an outgoing voice call to telephone, a SMS message to amobile telephone, an e-mail message to a valid address, posted to a Webpage available via an appropriate Web server or WAP alert to a WAPenabled device. Various types of screen displays and reports may be usedto provide information regarding generated alarms.

[0133] In one preferred embodiment referred to as AirDefense Mobile inU.S. Provisional Patent Application Serial No. ______ entitled “SYSTEMSAND METHODS FOR NEWTORK SECURITY” filed May 20, 2002 bearing AttorneyDocket No. 19282.0001U1, preferred interfaces for reviewing andreporting alarms are described in detail. The contents of thisapplication are hereby incorporated by this reference herein for allpurposes.

[0134] In some embodiment, the outputs of all IDS test are then comparedand a confidence level computed in step 345. In one such embodiment, inthe case where only a statistical anomaly is detected, it is flagged asa lower level performance alert. In the case where one or more otherviolations are detected, the alarm is elevated to an intrusion alarm.

[0135] Some embodiments may use a variety of data stores in implementingthe above process to track data across multiple iterations of theprocess; such data stores can in one preferred embodiment be part of anSDS as described above. Some such embodiments can include a statisticsdatabase, a station database and/or a state data store. In suchembodiments, some or all of the following steps depicted in FIG. 3 canoccur.

[0136] In step 315, a station database is updated. This databasecontains, in one preferred embodiment, per station and per access pointrecords with information describing device address, communicationsstate, timestamps of first and last activity, counts of bytetransmissions and local policy information describing whether device isauthorized or not for usage in the monitored network.

[0137] In step 320 state information is updated. State refers to whetheror not the device has been seen before and whether or not the station isunauthenticated and unassociated, authenticated, authenticated andassociated or unknown state information associated with the wirelesscomputer network.

[0138] In step 350, a determination is made as to whether a particularstatistics interval has been complete. If so, statistics in an SDS areupdated in step 355, and processing continues with the next frame instep 310. Otherwise, processing simply continues in step 310 with thenext reading or receiving of a frame.

[0139] A modified and enhance version of the above approach is usedwhere network traffic is monitored from multiple input devices such aswith the embodiments depicted in FIGS. 2B-E. FIG. 4 depicts thisenhanced process starting at step 405.

[0140] Step 410 is analogous to step 305 from the process of FIG. 3. Instep 410, configuration information is received. As before, this istypically done through reading system configuration files, monitoringthe network and/or interactive entry at the outset of the process. Thisinformation typically includes network default data and risk criteriasuch as access point configuration data (MAC Address of the accesspoint, Access Point Name, etc.), station configuration data and variousthresholds values.

[0141] In step 430, a wireless packet frame is received from each inputdevice (e.g., hardware components 210A-D, host system 220 and/or sensors230A, 230B). Frames are read so that the frame content can beinterrogated.

[0142] Each read frame is interrogated by a multi-dimensional intrusiondetection system (IDS) such as detailed above with respect to FIG. 3,and the outputs of all IDS tests are then compared and a confidencelevel computed in step 435. As with the process above, other tests ineither alone, in combination with each other or in combination with oneor more of those described above may be used in other embodiments.

[0143] In step 440, in the case where only a statistical anomaly isdetected, it is flagged as a lower level performance alert. In the casewhere, in addition to the statistical anomaly, one of the otherviolations has been detected, the alarm is elevated to an intrusionalarm and an alarm manger is alerted in step 444. Other embodiments donot rely on aggregate test outcome but determine alarm status on singletest outcomes. Further, some embodiments can use other test types andoutcome combinations to determine type and severity of alarms generated.

[0144] If an alarm is not detected in step 440, a test to see if apredetermined interval for gathering statistics has been reached occursin step 460. If the end of the pre-configured statistics gatheringinterval has occurred, the SDS is updated in step 470 to reflect thestatistics gathered from the received frames over the interval.Statistics are gathered by monitoring traffic between network nodes,minute-by-minute statistics about BSS frame types and traffic volumes,summaries of transmission statistics for all stations associated withaccess points, current-minute transmission statistics for all Stations,and detailed minute-by-minute transmission statistics for any individualstation in the wireless computer network.

[0145] Data fusion occurs on a batch basis by aggregating data frommultiple databases. This process begins at step 414. The processintegrates statistical data from multiple databases that is generatedthrough frame monitoring and intrusion detection engines. This approachprovides a methodology for managing data received from input devicessuch as hardware devices 210A-D and/or sensors 230A, 230B deployed atmultiple sites and for aggregating enterprise data at a single centralsystem such as host 220.

[0146] The Attack and Station Profile database is read at step 418 tobegin a processing loop to integrate databases from separate sources.Correlation and pattern recognition is performed at step 420 to updatethe attack and station profiles in step 424. The processing loop thensleeps at step 428 until the next processing loop interval is to takeplace based on the pre-configured time interval or trigger.

[0147] After the alarm manager is signaled in step 444, the attack andstation profile database is read in step 448; in this step, existingattacks are queried and existing station security state is queried. Instep 450, this data is compared to the newly generated alarm. If it issufficiently similar, no new external notification occurs in step 454.If it is not, a new notification message is generated in step 454 andconsole display and/or external messaging of the alarm occurs in step458.

[0148] As described above, systems and methods according to the presentinvention can automatically generate alarms whenever certain events orconditions occur within your wireless network. In some embodiments, analarm manager providing an interface for viewing can be provided; suchan interface is described in greater detail in co-pending “SYSTEMS ANDMETHODS FOR NEWTORK SECURITY” filed May 20, 2002 bearing Attorney DocketNo. 19282.0001U1. The following table identifies the alarms, alarmsubtypes and severities available in one preferred embodiment referredto as AirDefense Mobile. Alarm Alarm Type Alarm Subtype Level DoS AttackDe-authenticate Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when a hackerpretends to be an Access point and broad- casts a “de-authenticate”message. This forces all Stations to re-authenticate them- selves,generating excessive network traf- fic, and causing inconsistentconnectivity, and data transfer. Disassociate Critical AirDefense Mobiledetects when a hacker pre- tends to be an Access point and broadcasts a“disassociate” message. This forces all Stations to re-associatethemselves with the Access Point, generating excessive network traffic,and causing inconsistent connectivity and data transfer. UnauthorizedNot on allow list Critical Station AirDefense Mobile detects a Stationwhose MAC address is not on its Valid list. (A Valid list is maintainedby the system.) Threshold GLB CRC errors Major AirDefense Mobile detectsif CRC errors ex- ceeded configured limits (CRC errors are generatedwhen checksums fail on individ- ual frames.) BSS assoc count MajorAirDefense Mobile detects when the number of associations within anentire BSS, in any given minute, exceed the number specified in con-figuration information BSS signal strength Critical AirDefense Mobiledetects when the signal strength in any access point falls below aspecified threshold. BSS fragments Minor AirDefense Mobile detects whenthe number of fragmented frames within any minute exceed a specifiedthreshold. BSS decrypt errors Major AirDefense Mobile detects when thenumber of decrypt error frames within any minute ex- ceed a specifiedthreshold. BSS assoc stations Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when thetotal num- ber of associated Stations within an entire BSS, in any givenminute, exceed a specified number. BSS tbw in Minor AirDefense Mobiledetects when, during any minute, the number of bytes of data enteringthe BSS from the wired portion of your net- work exceed a set threshold.BSS tbw out Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when, during any minute, thetotal number of bytes of data going from the BSS to a wired portion ofyour network exceed a set threshold. BSS tbw intra Minor AirDefenseMobile detects when, during any minute, the total number of bytes ofdata originating from and destined for the BSS exceed a specifiedthreshold. BSS tbw thru Minor AirDefense Mobile detects when, during anyminute, the total number of bytes of data originating from a wiredportion of the net- work hop through the BSS to another wired portion ofthe network exceed a set threshold. BSS data Major AirDefense Mobiledetects when, during any minute, the total number of data frames in theBSS exceed a specified threshold. BSS mgt Major AirDefense Mobiledetects when, during any minute, the total number of management framesin the BSS exceed a specified threshold. BSS ctl Major AirDefense Mobiledetects when, during any minute, the total number of control frames inthe BSS exceed a set threshold. BSS ad hoc Critical AirDefense Mobiledetects when, during any minute, the total number of Ad Hoc frames inthe BSS exceed a specified threshold. Note: Wireless network adaptorcards of lesser quality will randomly generate Ad Hoc frames. AirDefenseMobile's default threshold (1) may cause all of these spurious frames togen- erate an alarm. After monitoring the network for a week or two, itmay be advisable to set the threshold to a number at or a little higherthan what the network normally generates. STA assoc count MajorAirDefense Mobile detects, during any minute, when any Stationassociates with an access point more times than provided by a specifiedthreshold. STA signal strength Critical AirDefense Mobile detects,during any minute, when any station's signal strength falls below avalue specified. STA fragments Minor AirDefense Mobile detects, duringany minute, when any station generates more fragmented frames than aspecified value. STA decrypt errors Major AirDefense Mobile detects,during any minute, when any station generates more decrypt errors than aset threshold. STA tbw received Minor AirDefense Mobile detects, withinany minute, when any station receives more bytes of data than apredetermined threshold. STA tbw transmitted Minor AirDefense Mobiledetects, within any minute, when any station transmits more bytes ofdata than specified in a set threshold. STA data received MajorAirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any station receivesmore data frames than a specified threshold. STA data transmitted MajorAirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any station transmitsmore data frames than a specified threshold. STA mgt received MajorAirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any station receivesmore management frames than a specified threshold. STA mgt transmittedMajor AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any stationtransmits more management frames than a set threshold. STA ctl receiveMajor AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when any stationreceives more control frames than a specified threshold. STA ctltransmit Major AirDefense Mobile detects, within any minute, when anystation transmits more control frames than a set threshold. ID Theft Outof sequence Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when frames aretransmitted out of sequence. This suggests that someone has spoofed aStation and is sending data at the same time as the legitimate Station.Vendor out of character Critical AirDefense Mobile compares everyStation's transmissions against an internal database of known vendor“transmission profiles” or “signatures.” If the actual network trafficdoes not match the vendor-profile associated with the Station's WirelessNIC, AirDefense Mobile assumes that the traffic originates from anunauthorized station using a spoofed NIC. Anomalous signal strengthCritical AirDefense Mobile tracks the high, low, and mean signalstrength of each station many times a minute throughout the day.Whenever it detects that the Station's signal strength deviates from thenorm, it generates an alarm. Access Point WEP mode changed Critical ModeAirDefense Mobile detects when the WEP value in an access point's beacondiffers from the value it is supposed to be. (AirDefense Mobileauto-detected the WEP property, or it was manually entered.) Ratechanged Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when the supportedtransmission rate values in an access point's beacon differs from thevalue it is supposed to be. (AirDefense Mobile auto-detected the rateproperty, or it was manually entered.) Channel changed CriticalAirDefense Mobile detects whenever an access point changes channels.(The channel is iden- tified in configuration information.) Cf changedAirDefense Mobile detects when the Point Coordination value in an AP'sbeacon changes. A change in this field may indicate that the accesspoint was reconfigured, though this is not necessarily a problem. (ThePoint Coordi- nation field refers to the access point's mode ofcollision avoidance.) Essid changed AirDefense Mobile detects when theaccess point's broadcast of its Extended BSS ID changes. The ESSIDinformation is stored as configuration information. UnauthorizedAirDefense Mobile detects when administration Critical AP Admin sessionsare being conducted directly with the access point. Odd Mgt. Sta tx apmgt fr Critical Frame AirDefense Mobile detects when a Station istransmitting a management frame reserved for access point's use. Ap txillegal mgt fr Critical AirDefense Mobile detects when an access pointtransmits an illegal management frame. Out of spec frame CriticalAirDefense Mobile detects when an access point transmits a frame thatdoes not follow 802.11b standards. Other bogus frame Critical AirDefenseMobile detects when an access point transmits any frame it does notunder- stand. Ad Hoc Net AirDefense Mobile detects when Stations areCritical Detected directly transmitting and receiving to and from eachother without using an authorized access point. Note: Unlike all otheralarms that are gener- ated every time the network event is detectedwithin a minute, AirDefense Mobile will only generate an Ad Hoc Networkalarm once in the current 24 hour period for each MAC address. AP BeaconAirDefense Mobile detects when an access Critical Rate point's beaconrate changed.

[0149] Active Defense

[0150] In some embodiments of the present invention, one or more activedefense mechanisms may be triggered in response to alarm in addition to,or instead of, the notification process described above. The system mayprovide active defense from attacks by broadcasting data into thewireless network as well as being able to trap and/or map an intruder'sworkstation by triangulating the position of the intruder's workstationrelative to the wireless network access points.

[0151] By introducing CRC errors into the wireless stream, the systemcan actively defeat an attacker that is monitoring the stream forpatterns to crack the encryption. CRC errors are introduced bytransmitting at the same time as the detected intruder.

[0152] Due the shared medium nature of the wireless computer network,the cause the packet transmission to be corrupted, preventing theintruder from successfully communicating with the network.

[0153] By introducing chaf, the system can actively defeat the attackerby placing random frames into the stream so that the encryption patternbecomes undetectable. Chaf is a form of randomized packet transmissionthat is designed to reduce the probability that a statistical analysisof the packet sequence would result in breaking of the encryption key.This is done by emitting a low-rate background transmission of packetsthat are emitted using the same characteristics (e.g., address,initialization vector, etc.) of legitimately observed traffic but with arandomized payload.

[0154] The system can lock-down a wireless network by jamming, atechnique to prevent any unauthorized access to the wireless accesspoint by introducing enough noise into the wireless network thatworkstations cannot physically connect to the wireless network. Jammingis a physical layer transmission that is performed to disrupt allunwanted wireless communications. It is equivalent to introducing anoise signal on top of the unwanted signal transmission such that anyreceiver would not be able to successfully receive the transmission.

[0155] In a Physical Device approachOne embodiment would utilize astandalone sensor to implement any of the Active Defense mechanisms.Dynamic channel change can be used to reroute authorized traffic to adifferent communication channel to avoid an intruder detected on aparticular channel. In this approach, a channel change request istransmitted to the access point believed to be compromised andauthorized stations use the new channel to communicate with the accesspoint. This approach can also be used to avoid interference causingproblems in communication between an access point and its authorizedstations.

[0156] Some embodiments including dynamic channel change may further usea honeypot trap that tricks the attacker into thinking the originalchannel is still valid and provides the necessary forensic informationto identify the attacker. FIG. 5 depicts a flow chart of a processstarting at step 510 used in some such embodiment incorporating thehoneypot trap.

[0157] In step 520, configuration information is received. This step ismuch the same as previously described steps 305 and 410 in FIGS. 3 and 4respectively. Step 530 represents a waiting loop that waits until anattack has been detected. Typically, an intrusion detection systemgenerates a signal that triggers departure from this loop; in somepreferred embodiments, the intrusion detection system contains thehardware and/or executes the process described above. The signal fromthe intrusion detection system typically includes an indicator of theaccess point believed to be under attack.

[0158] In the case that an attack has been detected in 530, processingis passed to step 540 to activate the honeypot trap. A trap thread isstarted in step 580; the thread initializes itself with the identity ofthe monitored access point believed to be attacked. This identitytypically includes the MAC address, Service Set Identifier, encryptionmode, network mode and transmission modes. Once initialized, the threadmoves to step 590, the Trap Intruder process. This process is designedto logically fool the identifier attacker into believing communicationis still occurring with the original access point. This is accomplishedthrough complete emulation of the original access point's identity andbehavior. By maintaining communication with the attacker, a trap iscreated such that the attacker's physical proximity is assured as longas communication continues. Optionally, a new identity may be assumedsuch that a weaker or more vulnerable appearing access point can bepresented to the attacker. This is done by again emulating access pointfunctionality, but in this case with an identity and set ofcharacteristics that appear vulnerable. This vulnerability appearancemay be created through the use of no or weak encryption modes or theappearance of default manufacturing modes with known passwords and userIDs.

[0159] In step 550 a control packet is sent to the original access pointto change channels or suspend transmission while the trap is engaged.This packet encapsulates a message indicating the above request and maybe sent in or out-of-band to the access point. In-band refers toover-the-air transmission to the access point's wireless networkinterface whereas out-of-band transmission refers to transmission to thewired side interface of the access point.

[0160] Processing in the main loop then returns to attack detection in530.

[0161] Triangulation determines the location of an attacker by mappingher relative position within the deployed wireless access points. Themapping and location detection process according to one or morepreferred embodiments of the present invention as depicted in FIGS. 6A-Bare discussed in greater detail below.

[0162] The process of FIG. 6A is used to create an internal database ofIP addresses and/or names mapped to corresponding MAC addresses. EveryAddress Resolution Protocol (ARP) transaction is detected in step 605.In step 610, the information in the detected transaction is used toupdate the internal database. Some embodiments can perform theidentification and location processing such as depicted in FIG. 6Bwithout reference to such an internal database. This database is createdand maintained in one preferred embodiment to make the stationidentification and location process easier and more efficient.

[0163]FIG. 6B depicts a process for identifying and locating a stationwithin the wireless network. In some embodiments, this process can beused to pinpoint the location of a potential attacker, in some suchembodiments, activation of the process is triggered by an intrusiondetection system. In a preferred embodiment, the process is triggered byone of the intrusion detections systems and methods described in detailabove.

[0164] In step 620, a lookup occurs in the internal database, such ascreated via the process depicted in FIG. 6A, on the current MAC addressto determine if an IP or name mapping is already available. If found,the internal database is updated in step 640 and execution proceeds tostep 645 to query the wireless sensor array, to begin position orlocation resolution. As indicated above, the internal database is oneapproach to acquiring the desired information. Some embodiments may skipthis step and use either the wired network sensor or the reverse addressresolution protocol (RARP) approach discussed below.

[0165] Otherwise, an optional wired network sensor can be queried forthe name mapping in step 625. This sensor is preferably deployed withinthe wired network at a location convenient to sniffing DHCP, LDAP, DNSor other service/name mapping protocols. If found, the internal databaseis updated in step 640 and execution proceeds to step 645 to query thewireless sensor array, to begin position or location resolution. Someembodiments may not include such a wired network sensor; in which casethis step is skipped.

[0166] If name is still not found, execution proceeds to step 630 wherea RARP request is issued. This request asks the receiver population forthe IP address of the MAC address in question. If found, the internaldatabase is updated in step 640 and execution proceeds to step 645 toquery the wireless sensor array, to begin position or locationresolution.

[0167] If not found, name/IP mapping is not available at current timefor this MAC address. In some embodiments, name/IP mapping may not bedesired but location or position information is in which case theprocess can begin in such embodiments at step 645.

[0168] Step 645 begins the position or location resolution with a queryto the wireless sensor array. Each sensor is queried for trackinginformation on the current MAC address in question. This trackinginformation identifies whether the MAC is currently observable by agiven sensor, the sensor ID, and the signal strength associated with theMAC in question. The sensor array may include not only sensor devices(e.g., 230A, 230B) but also other wireless nodes accessible from thisprocess such as devices 210A-D and/or host system 220.

[0169] From the data received via the query, the position relative togrid of sensors is calculated in step 650 by computing the “signalstrength” distance to each sensor. This distance is computed as thesquare root of the sum of squares of three sensor signal strengthvalues. The position is then estimated to be within the proximity of thesensors determined to have the smallest signal strength distance to theMAC address in question per the above computation. Once the set ofsensors is selected, the position is further refined by selected theposition as within the proximity of the sensor within above set with thestrongest signal strength. In some embodiments, the process ends at thispoint with the position information being returned.

[0170] In embodiments maintaining a position database, this database isupdated in step 660 with the position of the MAC address in question.The process then ends at step 670.

[0171] Encrypted Network Analysis and Management

[0172] The techniques utilized to monitor WLANs can apply in general tomonitoring and analyzing any network link using encryption of thepayload or at the IP layer and above rather than just WLANs. In thiscase, Layer 1 and Layer 2 are observed and decisions made at theselayers in terms of signature, protocol, policy and statistical anomalyanalysis to assess network health and security. This technique is thusapplicable to any network (wired or wireless) exhibiting the aboveencryption characteristics of the network traffic. In other words, themulti-dimensional IDS implemented per our framework is more broadlyapplicable to managing and securing any encrypted network. In this case,a WLAN running WEP is one particular instance of an encrypted network.

[0173] Throughout this application, various publications may have beenreferenced. The disclosures of these publications in their entiretiesare hereby incorporated by reference into this application in order tomore fully describe the state of the art to which this inventionpertains.

[0174] The embodiments described above are given as illustrativeexamples only. It will be readily appreciated by those skilled in theart that many deviations may be made from the specific embodimentsdisclosed in this specification without departing from the invention.Accordingly, the scope of the invention is to be determined by theclaims below rather than being limited to the specifically describedembodiments above.

What is claimed is:
 1. A network security system, the system comprising:a) a system data store capable of storing network default andconfiguration data; b) a wireless transmitter capable of transmittingcommunications over a wireless computer network; c) a system processorcomprising one or more processing elements, wherein the system processoris in communication with the system data store and the wirelesstransmitter and wherein the system processor is programmed or adapted toperform the steps comprising of: i) receiving an active defense requestsignal, wherein the request signal comprises an indicator correspondingto a potentially compromised access point in the wireless computernetwork; and ii) responsive to the received request signal, triggeringone or more of the following defensive actions: 1) transmitting a signalvia the wireless transmitter to jam communications targeted at thepotentially compromised access point; 2) transmitting a signal via thewireless transmitter to corrupt communications targeted at thepotentially compromised access point by introducing CRC errors; 3)transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to increasedifficulty associated with breaking of encryption associated with thewireless computer network and the potentially compromised access point,wherein the signal includes packets emulating legitimate traffic butwith randomized payloads; or 4) transmitting a channel change requestcommunication via the wireless transmitter to the potentiallycompromised access point.
 2. The system of claim 1, wherein the systemprocessor is further programmed or adapted to perform the stepscomprising of receiving configuration information and storing thereceived configuration information in the system data store.
 3. Thesystem of claim 2, wherein the configuration information is received bythe system processor from a configuration file, from an interactive dataentry interface or from a command line.
 4. The system of claim 2,wherein the received configuration information comprises network defaultdata.
 5. The system of claim 2, further comprising a wireless receivercapable of receiving communications transmitted over the wirelesscomputer network and wherein the system processor is programmed oradapted to monitor the wireless computer network using the wirelessreceiver as part of its programming or adaptation to receiveconfiguration information.
 6. The system of claim 1, wherein the systemprocessor is further programmed or adapted to perform the stepcomprising of notifying an administrator of the received request signal.7. The system of claim 1, wherein the system processor is furtherprogrammed or adapted to perform the step comprising of mapping stationidentity.
 8. The system of claim 1, wherein the system processor isfurther programmed or adapted to perform the step comprising of mappingstation location.
 9. The system of claim 1, further comprising amounting card comprising a standard computer interface allowingcommunication between components mounted thereon and a computer systemand wherein at least one of the processing elements of the system datastore and the wireless transmitter are mounted on mounting card.
 10. Thesystem of claim 9, wherein the standard computer interface is an ISA busconnection, an EISA bus connection, a PCMCIA connection, a USBconnection, a SCSI connection, a serial port connection or a parallelport connection.
 11. The system of claim 1, further comprising awireless receiver capable of receiving communications transmitted overthe wireless computer network.
 12. The system of claim 11, wherein theone or more triggered defensive actions comprises transmitting a channelchange request communication and wherein the system processor is furtherprogrammed or adapted to perform the steps comprising of assumingcharacteristics associated with the potentially compromised access pointand emulating the potentially compromised access point in communicatingwith a potential intruder.
 13. The system of claim 12, wherein thesystem processor is further programmed or adapted to perform the stepscomprising of identifying a node associated with the potential intruderand locating the identified node.
 14. The system of claim 11, whereinthe system processor is further programmed or adapted to perform thestep comprising of monitoring the wireless computer network using thewireless receiver.
 15. The system of claim 14, wherein the systemprocessor is further programmed or adapted to perform the stepcomprising of communicating information derived from monitoring thewireless computer network to an intrusion detections system.
 16. Thesystem of claim 15, further comprising a wired communication interfacevia which the system processor communicates with the intrusion detectionsystem.
 17. The system of claim 15, further comprising the intrusiondetection system and wherein the system processor is programmed oradapted to receive the active defense request signal from the intrusiondetection system.
 18. The system of claim 1, wherein the systemprocessor is further programmed or adapted to perform the step ofselecting one or more defensive actions to be triggered.
 19. The systemof claim 18, wherein the received active defense request signal furthercomprises a security indicator indicating a type of risk to the wirelesscomputer network and wherein the system processor is further programmedor adapted to perform the step of selecting one or more defensiveactions based upon the security indicator in the received active defenserequest signal.
 20. The system of claim 18, wherein the received activedefense request signal further comprises a defense indicatorcorresponding to one or more defensive actions to be triggered andwherein the system processor is further programmed or adapted to performthe step of selecting one or more defensive actions based upon thedefense indicator in the received active defense request signal.
 21. Anetwork security method, the method comprising the steps of: a)receiving configuration information comprising network configuration anddefault data from a configuration file, an interactive data entryinterface or a command line interface or from monitoring a wirelesscomputer network; b) receiving an active defense request signal from anintrusion detection system, wherein the received request signalcomprises an access point indicator corresponding to a potentiallycompromised access point in the wireless computer network and a riskindicator; c) responsive to the received request signal, selecting oneor more defensive actions based upon the received request signal fromthe group consisting of: i) transmitting a signal to jam communicationstargeted at the potentially compromised access point; ii) transmitting asignal to corrupt communications targeted at the potentially compromisedaccess point by introducing CRC errors; iii) transmitting a signal toincrease difficulty associated with breaking of encryption associatedwith the wireless computer network and the potentially compromisedaccess point, wherein the signal comprises packets emulating legitimatetraffic but with randomized payloads; and iv) transmitting a channelchange request communication to the potentially compromised accesspoint; and d) triggering the selected one or more defensive actions; ande) identifying a node or location associated with a potential intruderinteracting with the potentially compromised access point.
 22. Computerreadable storage media storing instructions that upon execution by asystem processor cause the system processor to perform the method ofclaim
 21. 23. A network security system, the system comprising: a)storing means for receiving and storing configuration informationcomprising network configuration and default data; b) wireless receivingmeans for receiving communications transmitted over the wirelesscommunication network; c) wireless transmitting means for transmittingcommunications over the wireless communication network; d) defenserequest receiving means for receiving an active defense request signalfrom an intrusion detection system, wherein the received request signalcomprises an access point indicator corresponding to a potentiallycompromised access point in the wireless computer network and a riskindicator; e) active defense means for selecting one or more defensiveactions based upon a received request signal received by the defenserequest receiving means from the group consisting of: i) transmitting asignal via the wireless transmitting means intended to jamcommunications targeted at the potentially compromised access point; ii)transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitting means to corruptcommunications targeted at the potentially compromised access point byintroducing CRC errors; iii) transmitting a signal via the wirelesstransmitting means to increase difficulty associated with breaking ofencryption associated with the wireless computer network and thepotentially compromised access point, wherein the signal includespackets emulating legitimate traffic but with randomized payloads; andiv) transmitting a channel change request communication to thepotentially compromised access point via the wireless transmittingmeans; and for triggering the selected one or more defensive actions;and f) mapping means for identifying a node or location associated witha potential intruder interacting with the potentially compromised accesspoint.